Day 40 of the Hormuz Crisis
Japan’s Oil Reserves &
Global Blackouts
“We have 240 days of reserves.” Behind that number,
gas stations at the end of the supply chain are already running dry.
On February 28, 2026, the U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately 25% of global seaborne oil trade—roughly 20 million barrels per day—passed through this chokepoint. The IEA has called it “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market.” This report examines Japan’s actual oil inventory, the countries where blackouts have already struck, and three scenarios for the road ahead.
Japan’s Oil Reserves — The Reality Behind “240 Days”
Overview (as of March 21, 2026)
| Category | Days of Supply | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| National (Government) Reserves | 146 days | Stored as crude oil; requires refining |
| Private-Sector (Industry) Reserves | 88 days | Includes operational inventories at refineries & depots |
| Producer-Country Joint Reserves | 6 days | UAE, Saudi Arabia & Kuwait oil stored in Japanese tanks |
| Total | ~240 days | — |
At first glance, eight months of supply. But this headline figure carries three critical caveats.
① Crude oil ≠ petroleum products. The “days of supply” calculation is based on crude oil alone. But Japan’s actual petroleum consumption includes naphtha and other refined products. On a total-consumption basis, the effective stockpile may be only 130–140 days (roughly 4 months).
② Days of supply ≠ immediately available volume. National reserves are stored as crude. Transport to refineries, refining, distribution to depots, and last-mile tanker-truck delivery take 4–6 weeks. In the 2022 Ukraine-related release, full delivery took six months.
③ Private reserves are “working inventory.” Most private-sector stockpiles are operational buffers constantly consumed in daily refining and distribution. Even after the 2011 earthquake, the drawdown was limited to just 3 days.
The Release — A Record 45 Days
- March 16 – Release of 15 days of private-sector reserves began
- March 26 – Release of 30 days of national reserves (~8.5 million kl / ¥540 billion) from 11 bases nationwide
- March – 5 days of producer-country joint reserves released
- May (planned) – PM Takaichi announced an additional ~20 days of releases
The combined 45 days / ~80 million barrels is the largest release in Japan’s history, representing about 20% of the IEA’s coordinated 400-million-barrel global release.
The Refining Companies
Under Japan’s Petroleum Stockpiling Act, refining companies are obligated to maintain 70 days of reserves. However, individual company inventory data is not publicly disclosed. The four companies receiving national reserves are ENEOS, Idemitsu Kosan, Cosmo Oil, and Taiyo Oil.
| Company | Market Share (est.) | Key Refineries | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| ENEOS HD | ~50% | Negishi, Mizushima, Oita, Muroran, etc. | Largest recipient; hosts national reserves at Ki-ire base |
| Idemitsu Kosan | ~30% | Chiba, Aichi, Hokkaido, Tokuyama, etc. | Merged with Showa Shell. Nationwide network |
| Cosmo Energy HD | ~15% | Chiba, Sakai, Yokkaichi | Iwatani as top shareholder. Has Middle East upstream assets |
| Taiyo Oil | ~5% | Kikuma (Shikoku) | Adjacent to Kikuma national reserve base |
What’s Happening at the End of the Supply Chain
The government’s “240 days” is a macro figure. At the retail level, supply disruptions have already begun.
- March 12 – “Okamoto Self,” a chain of 130 gas stations across Hokkaido and Tohoku, publicly announced closures due to fuel stock-outs
- Mid-March onward – Multiple trucking companies in the Chugoku region reported diesel delivery delays and volume restrictions. Some had in-tank supply halved
- April 7 – Government began on-site inspections of stations charging “significantly high” prices despite subsidies; doubled the frequency of retail price surveys
The problem is not that nationwide inventory has run out. It’s that the distribution hierarchy (direct-contract stations → sub-dealers → independents) and geographic imbalance mean the weakest links dry up first. Raising prices doesn’t help — if the tanker truck doesn’t come, there’s nothing to sell.
Alternative Supply Progress
| Arrival | Route | Status |
|---|---|---|
| March 28 | Yanbu Port (Saudi Red Sea coast) | Arrived in Ehime (1st ship) |
| April 5 | Fujairah Port (UAE) | Arrived |
| April 25 (est.) | Non-Middle East (North America, etc.) | En route |
| May | 8 tankers from U.S. Gulf Coast | ~12 million barrels. Bound for Chiba & Kagoshima. 4× year-ago levels |
The government states that “20%+ of prior-year volumes will be replaced in April, and more than half by May,” and that “supply can be maintained through the year.” However, alternative routes take 2.5× longer (~50 days vs. ~20), cost 2–3× more, and U.S. crude differs in composition from Middle Eastern grades, potentially requiring refinery adjustments.
Global Blackouts — Where the Lights Have Gone Out
The Hormuz crisis is dismantling social infrastructure in order — starting with countries that have the thinnest reserves and the least bargaining power for alternative supply.
On March 16, a total grid collapse plunged all 11 million Cubans into darkness for 29 hours. It happened again on March 21. Three nationwide blackouts in a single month.
President Díaz-Canel acknowledged that “no foreign oil has arrived for three months.” The cause: the Trump administration’s intervention in Venezuela (Maduro’s arrest in January) cut off Cuba’s sole crude supply. Havana residents endure 16+ hours of daily outages. Refrigerators fail, food spoils, water pumps stop. In the city of Morón, residents set fire to Communist Party headquarters after a 26-hour blackout.
Already suffering intermittent rolling blackouts since summer 2023, the Hormuz crisis has made things worse. From March 28, shops, malls, and restaurants must close by 9 PM daily (10 PM on Thursdays and Fridays). Energy import costs doubled from $1.2 billion in January to $2.5 billion in March. Fuel prices were raised 14–30%.
The structural vulnerability: Egypt had been diverting domestically produced gas to exports for foreign currency, starving its own power plants. Then the Gaza war cut Israeli gas imports, and the Hormuz blockade choked Gulf refined fuel supplies — a double blow.
Despite holding some of East Africa’s largest oil reserves, South Sudan imports refined fuel. Its main power supplier, Jedco, has implemented rotational blackouts across Juba to conserve oil-fired generation fuel.
Universities have been sent on early holiday. Government and private working hours and banking services have been cut. Outages are increasingly frequent as authorities try to stretch reserves. The garment export sector — the country’s economic backbone — is under severe strain.
Countries on the Brink
| Country | Status |
|---|---|
| Philippines | Energy emergency declared March 24. 387 gas stations closed. Emergency purchase of 700,000 barrels from Russia |
| Sri Lanka | Wednesdays declared public holidays. Private vehicles rationed to 15 L/week, motorcycles 5 L |
| Myanmar | Odd/even license plate alternate-day driving. QR-code fuel rationing system |
| Nepal | LPG cylinder fills limited to half-capacity |
| Pakistan | Malls and markets close at 8 PM. 99% of LNG imports from Qatar/UAE |
| India | Long queues for LPG. Gujarat ceramics industry shut down. Mumbai hotels closed. Reversion to kerosene, coal, firewood |
| Ethiopia | Fuel prioritized for security forces and essential industry. Distribution fully suspended in Tigray |
| Slovenia | First EU fuel rationing (private: 50 L/day, businesses: 200 L/day) |
| Italy | Jet fuel restrictions at 4 airports (Bologna, Milan, Treviso, Venice) |
Outlook — Three Scenarios
On April 8, a provisional ceasefire was agreed between the U.S. and Iran. As of April 9, however, the Strait of Hormuz remains “effectively closed” — Iran continues to restrict and condition transit. Approximately 230 loaded tankers are stranded inside the Gulf. Pipeline bypass capacity stands at ~9 million bpd (less than half of normal Hormuz flows). The EIA projects Brent crude at $115/barrel for Q2 2026.
| Period | Outlook |
|---|---|
| Mid-April | Limited transit resumes under Iran-Oman supervision (3–5 million bpd) |
| May | Mine clearance and escort regime established; throughput recovers to ~10 million bpd |
| June–July | Recovery to 70–80% of pre-crisis levels. Stranded tanker backlog cleared |
| Q3 onward | Brent eases to $80s. Strategic reserve replenishment begins |
Impact on Japan
May alternative-supply buildup coincides with strait reopening; supply constraints ease rapidly after a May peak. Rural gas station shortages resolve by June. Gasoline prices return to ¥160s before summer.
Global Impact
Energy emergencies in Philippines, Sri Lanka, etc. lifted by June. Cuba’s recovery lags due to structural issues. India’s LPG shortage normalizes by July.
| Period | Outlook |
|---|---|
| April–May | Japan’s tightest period. Reserve drawdowns accelerate. Rural station closures and volume caps expand |
| June | Alternative supply reaches 50–60% of prior-year volumes; drawdown pace slows |
| July–Sept | Brent stays at $100–120. Gasoline subsidies strain Japan’s budget (>¥100 billion/month) |
| Oct–Dec | Reserves fall to ~100 days (national) and ~60 days (private). Second-round release debated |
| Q1 2027 | Bypass sourcing entrenches as “new normal,” but higher costs become permanent |
Impact on Japan
Supply “barely holds” through the year, but rural/remote gas station closures accelerate (500–800/year). De facto diesel priority allocation for logistics. Naphtha shortages extend chemical-industry curtailments. Fuel subsidy costs balloon to ¥2–3 trillion for FY2026.
Global Impact
Rolling blackouts become routine in South and Southeast Asia. Bangladesh garments and Pakistani textiles face order declines. European summer flights cut 10–15%. Global growth slows 0.5–1.0%.
| Period | Outlook |
|---|---|
| April–May | Transshipment hubs (Salalah, etc.) come under attack; bypass routes themselves become high-risk |
| June | Brent exceeds $150. Gulf producers cut exports further to secure domestic consumption |
| July–Sept | Global stagflation takes hold. Fuel rationing discussions begin even in advanced economies |
| Oct–Dec | Japan’s effective reserves fall below 3 months. LNG stocks at power companies tighten; planned blackouts enter discussion |
| 2027 | Synchronized global recession. Energy security frameworks fundamentally restructured |
Impact on Japan
Reserve drawdowns and bidding wars for alternative supply drain foreign exchange. Yen weakens to ¥170–180 range, raising import costs and accelerating reserve depletion in a vicious cycle. Gas station closures exceed 1,000; “fuel deserts” become a social crisis. Heating oil for winter 2026 becomes the paramount concern.
Global Impact
Cuba-style nationwide blackouts spread to Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar. Parts of India experience large-scale outages. Global food prices spike (30% of fertilizer transits Hormuz). China and Russia rapidly expand influence as “energy suppliers of last resort.”
It is whether supply exists at all.
And the burden of “having nothing” does not fall equally. Between nations, it hits those with the thinnest reserves first. Within nations, it hits the tail end of the distribution chain — rural areas, remote communities. Across industries, it strikes logistics, agriculture, and healthcare — sectors with no substitutes. The weakest links break first.
Japan’s 240-day figure represents one of the deepest strategic stockpiles in the world. But it does not mean there is gasoline at every station nationwide. Days of reserves and days of supply capability are two different things — and that gap is becoming visible right now, at the retail level.
How far the April 8 ceasefire holds will determine which of the three scenarios unfolds.